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Abstract: Security is a critical issue for sensor networks used in hostile environments. 
When wireless sensor nodes in a wireless sensor network are distributed in an insecure 
hostile environment, the sensor nodes must be protected: a secret key must be used to 
protect the nodes transmitting messages. If the nodes are not protected and become 
compromised, many types of attacks against the network may result. Such is the case with 
existing schemes, which are vulnerable to attacks because they mostly provide a hop-by-
hop paradigm, which is insufficient to defend against known attacks. We propose a 
location-aware dynamic session-key management protocol for grid-based wireless sensor 
networks. The proposed protocol improves the security of a secret key. The proposed 
scheme also includes a key that is dynamically updated. This dynamic update can lower the 
probability of the key being guessed correctly. Thus currently known attacks can be 
defended. By utilizing the local information, the proposed scheme can also limit the 
flooding region in order to reduce the energy that is consumed in discovering routing paths. 
Keywords: attack; grid-based; key management; security; wireless sensor networks 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, there have been major advances in the development of wireless sensors and IC 
process technology. Due to these advances, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been replacing 
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traditional network technologies [1-4]. These WSNs have a number of advantages over wired 
networks, such as ease of deployment, extended transmission range, and self-organization. 
There are, however, a few inherent limitations to WSNs. These include low communication 
bandwidth, small storage capacity, limited computation resources, and limited device energy. In terms 
of energy, many researchers assume that all nodes in a sensor network are battery-driven [5,6]. 
Because of this, energy is a very scarce resource in sensor networks. Therefore, energy efficiency is an 
important design issue in WSNs.  
Currently, WSNs are used in various applications. Figure 1 shows a schematic of applications for 
WSNs. Among their many applications, they can be used in the military, in agriculture, in 
transportation, in manufacturing, and in smart homes. 
Figure 1. Wireless sensor network applications. 
 
Generally speaking, a WSN consists of hundreds or thousands of densely populated sensor nodes 
that sense the environment they are in and collaboratively work to process and route sensor data. These 
sensor nodes relay data streams to base stations either periodically or based on events. A base station 
can be stationary or mobile. If it is mobile, it can move among the sensors and collect data. In a 
network densely populated with sensor nodes, the area detected by the sensors may overlap, and thus 
the data sensed by the sensors may be similar. Many wireless collisions occur in this type of network. 
The general characteristics of a wireless sensor network include the following: ability for multiple 
deployments, low cost, small size, and adequate battery power supply. In addition, there are two types 
of structures for routing transmissions in a wireless sensor network: Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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(1) Cluster: The cluster structure is the most representative of the routing protocols. The general 
concept behind the cluster structure is to group a large number of sensors into several clusters. In each 
cluster, a node is chosen as the cluster header. The cluster header collects information from the other 
sensor nodes within that cluster and transmits the information to the base station. 
(2) Chaining: The chaining structure differs from the cluster structure in that each detector node in a 
network is linked together to form a chain. In each round, a node in the chaining structure is chosen as 
the chain header. Nodes on both ends of the chain transmit data to adjacent nodes in the direction of 
the chain header, and each receiving node gathers the information. Finally, the chaining header 
transmits the information to the base station. 
One of several basic network topologies may be used in WSN. The basic network topologies are 
shown in Figure 2. These include the star, tree, ring, fully connected, bus, and mesh topologies. 
Different topologies have different features or difficulties. Fully connected networks suffer from 
problems of NP-complexity. If nodes are added to this topology, the number of links increases 
exponentially. Mesh networks are regularly distributed networks that generally allow transmission 
only to a node’s nearest neighbors. In the star topology, all nodes are connected to a single hub node.  
Figure 2. Network topology. 
(A) STAR
(C ) RING
(E) BUS
(B) TREE
(D) Fully Connected
(F) MESH
 
 
It is important to choose the right typology for a network. The type of topology used is important 
because it affects many network characteristics, such as robustness, energy consumption, and latency. 
The complexity of data routing and processing also depends on the topology.  
Moreover, it is also very important to choose a proper encryption system to protect any transmitted 
messages. Due to the limited computation resource of a wireless sensor node, public key algorithms 
(such as Diffie-Hellman key management [7] or the RSA mechanism [8]) are not feasible for solving 
security problems. We therefore propose a low cost dynamic session-key management for grid-based 
wireless sensor networks. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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2. Related Works 
In this section, we will review the existing key management protocols for wireless sensor networks. 
We have classified these protocols into five types: the Random Key Pre-distribution Protocol, the 
Group-based Key Pre-distribution Protocol, the Hierarchical Key Pre-distribution Protocol, the Direct 
Communication Protocol, and the Grid-based Routing Protocol. 
2.1. Five Types of Key Management Protocols 
(1) Random Key Pre-distribution Protocol  
This protocol has three steps: key pre-distribution, key sharing, and key establishment. Before the 
deployment of any sensor node, m sets of keys are selected from a large key pool. The m keys form a 
key chain which is sent to each sensor node. One key is selected from among the nodes and is used to 
transmit data within the group. However, each sensor node must store m keys. 
Blom’s method [9] used a global matrix pool to replace the global key pool. In the key   
pre-distribution phase, each node randomly selects several matrices from the global matrices pool. In 
this case, any two adjacent nodes have a row of elements from the same matrix that can establish a 
pair-wise key.  
In 2003, Pietro et al. [10] proposed a random key transmission protocol. The random keys are 
transmitted between the sensor nodes such that any two nodes can establish a secure communication 
channel. The shortcoming of this method is that each sensor node must store more than three sets of 
keys. In order to enhance security, the number of keys must be increased. However, an increase in the 
number of keys increases the load of the sensor nodes. Power consumption is also increased. 
(2) Group-based Key Pre-distribution Protocol 
The Group-based Key Pre-distribution Protocol is used to divide the area where the nodes are into 
several sections. Nodes are placed or dropped into a pre-defined area such that the sensor nodes have a 
higher probability of good communication. 
Liu and Ning [11] proposed a paired key protocol which uses a polynomial key pool and   
pre-distribution of a grid key. This protocol has higher elasticity in catch and attack. It also has 
superior sensor node communication. However, the key management algorithm is relatively 
complicated. More time is required to generate a key. 
(3) Hierarchical Key Pre-distribution Protocol 
The hierarchical key pre-distribution protocol’s elements include a base station, a cluster header, 
and sensor nodes. Before deployment, each cluster header stores keys. After deployment, the nodes in 
a network will exchange identification codes. At the same time, that the identification codes are being 
exchanged, the cluster header will be informed of the identification codes of the sensor nodes. The 
sensor nodes in the whole network can then communicate with each other. However, if one of the 
nodes is caught, the information transmitted between the cluster header and the sensor nodes can be 
easily observed by an enemy. Therefore, the cluster header must increase the number of keys to Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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improve security. The resources of the sensor nodes are limited, however, making an increase in the 
number of keys impracticable.  
Cheng and Agrawal [12] proposed an improved key distribution mechanism (IKDM) which makes 
use of bivariate polynomials to develop a secure wireless sensor network. In this scheme, each gateway 
does not directly store the gateway keys of the nodes. Instead, each gateway stores bivariate 
polynomial functions. After deployment, a node sends its identification code and the gateway numbers 
to the nearest gateway. Then the gateway receiving the data asks other gateways to obtain sub-keys. 
The nearest gateway can then compute the gateway keys of its neighboring nodes from these sub-keys. 
Other similar schemes, such as the one by Jolly et al. [13], are also based on the Identity-Based 
symmetric keying scheme.  
(4) Direct Communication Protocol 
In direct communication in WSNs [14,15], all sensor nodes both gather data and then as well as 
transmit the collected data directly to the base station. This is extremely energy inefficient, since path 
loss in wireless systems is proportional to R
n, where R is the distance between a sensor node and the 
base station, and n typically ranges between 2 and 4. Therefore, because of energy inefficiency, long 
distance transmission in direct communication consumes more power. In addition, in a network which 
consists of a large number of sensor nodes, direct communication may not be feasible because of the 
large number of collisions. Multiple access schemes can be used to reduce the number of collisions, 
but the radio bandwidth of each sensor node would be reduced. Alternatively, direct communication 
can only be used in a small area with just a few sensor nodes in that area. 
(5) Grid-based Routing Protocol 
In recent years, many researchers [15-20] have studied how to use efficient grid-based data 
dissemination protocols for base stations. In the following section, we will introduce the relevant works. 
(5.1) Two-Tier Data Dissemination 
A Two-Tier Data Dissemination (TTDD) approach [15,16] provides scalable and efficient data 
delivery to multiple mobile base stations. The mobile base stations are in constant motion because they 
are used to build a two-tier structure in sensor networks. TTDD exploits local flooding within a local 
cell of a grid, which the sources build proactively. Each source uses the nodes on the grid line to 
transmit data to the base station. However, TTDD does not optimize the path from the source to the 
base stations. Also, TTDD frequently resumes establishing the entire path to the base stations when the 
path is down. Figure 3 shows the data forwarding process in TDD. 
(5.2) Coordination-Based Data Dissemination Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks 
Mobile base stations using flooding to send queries to the nearest grid points. Queries are routed 
along the grid and data is traced along the path back to the base stations. As a result, the control 
overhead introduced by base station mobility is limited to the grid cell where a base station is located.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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A coordination-based data dissemination protocol for wireless sensor networks (CODE) [17] 
considers energy efficiency and network lifetime, especially for sensor networks with high node 
density. CODE uses a grid structure to establish an efficient data dissemination path between the 
sources and a mobile base station. Figure 4 shows a grid structure that is used to transmit data. A 
sensor node is selected to be a coordinator in each grid. When the mobile base station sends a query  
to the source node, the source node will receive the query and will then transmit data to the   
mobile base station. 
Figure 3. The TTDD scheme for a source node forwarding data to a mobile base station. 
 
Figure 4. The CODE scheme for multi-hop routing through coordinators. 
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(5.3) Data Aggregation for Range Queries 
Chen  et al. [20] presented an efficient data aggregation algorithm for range queries (DARQ). 
DARQ is based on a grid structure. Figure 5 shows a DARQ scheme in which sensor nodes can 
determine their own locations using GPS.  
In Chen’s scheme, a mobile base station makes requests for the source to aggregate regular-sharp 
data. When a source receives a query packet, it constructs an aggregate data tree. This scheme is able 
to aggregate data in the sensor field with void regions. Void regions are regions in which there are no 
nodes in a grid because obstacles exist in the grid, no node is deployed, or a node has already   
died. Chen’s scheme utilizes the proposed face routing scheme [21] to discover where the void regions 
are and make a detour to avoid the void regions. When a node cannot deliver packets by   
greedy-forwarding, it uses face routing to make a detour to avoid the void regions. 
Figure 5. The DARQ scheme for data aggregation with regular-shape ranges. 
 
Our proposed scheme to generate dynamic key management is based on the DARQ scheme, one-way 
hash function, “two-way” mutual authentication, and symmetric encryption mechanism. A new key 
will be generated from the previous two keys when a sensor node transmits data in each transaction. 
The new key will be used for encryption to protect the gathered data. When the sensor node transmits 
data to a cluster node, the cluster node will request the decryption key of the sensor node from the base 
station. Since the base station has recorded two primary keys for all sensor nodes, it will transmit the 
required keys of that sensor node to the cluster node. After receiving the primary keys, the cluster node 
can decrypt the protected keys.  
When the number of sets of the received data is larger than a threshold value t, the data will be 
encrypted and transmitted to the base station. In order to ensure information security, the method for 
generating the keys for the sensor nodes is the same as the method for the cluster node. In addition, one 
of the keys transmitted between the base station and the cluster node and another key transmitted Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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between the base station and the sensor nodes will be updated dynamically in order to improve 
network security. 
Although Liao et al. [22] solved the flooding problem [15], they did not solve the security problem. 
This paper investigates the security problem in a grid-based routing protocol by exploiting local 
flooding within a local cell of a grid which sources build proactively. 
2.2. Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography 
Public-key cryptography has been deemed computationally expensive for small sensor nodes, and 
traditional public-key algorithms (such as RSA) require extensive computation. As a result, public-key 
cryptography is not considered feasible for small sensors [23]. However, recent progress in Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) [24] provides new opportunities to utilize public-key cryptography in 
sensor networks. ECC offers security equivalent to that of public-key cryptography using much 
smaller key sizes. ECC is especially attractive for constrained wireless devices because the smaller 
keys result in memory, bandwidth and computational savings. NIST [25] has listed the equivalent key 
sizes for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, as Table 1 shows: 
Table 1. Equivalent key sizes for symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. 
Bits of Security  Symmetric Algorithm  RSA  ECC 
80   2TDEA  k = 1,024  f = 160–223 
112   3TDEA  k = 2,048  f = 224–255 
128   AES-128  k = 3,072  f = 256–383 
192   AES-192  k = 7,680  f = 384–511 
256  AES-256  k = 15,360  f = 512+ 
 
As we known, the security of ECC rests on the difficulty of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem. Recently, Mizanur Rahman and El-Khatib [23] proposed a private key agreement and secure 
communication for heterogeneous sensor networks which is based on pairing-based cryptography over 
an elliptic curve. Using this protocol, any two nodes that need to communicate can independently 
compute the same secret key by using pairing and identity-based encryption properties. 
2.3. Global Positioning System (GPS) 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a system which is able to give the exact location of an 
object on the Earth at anytime, in any weather, and in any location. It is a satellite-based, radio 
navigation system. The satellite used by the GPS system is continuously monitored by ground stations 
located worldwide. The satellites transmit signals that can be detected by anyone with a GPS receiver. 
Using the receiver, one can determine the location of an object with great precision [26-29]. 
GPS has three parts: a space segment, a user segment, and a control segment. The space segment 
consists of 24 satellites, each in its own orbit 11,000 nautical miles above the Earth. The user segment 
consists of receivers which can be hand-held or mounted in a car. The control segment consists of 
ground stations (five ground stations located around the world) that make sure the satellites are Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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working properly. GPS receivers typically work well outdoors, with positioning accuracy within   
a 15 meter range. 
2.4. Basic Assumptions 
In this section, we present the basic model for sensor networks. The network model uses the 
following basic assumptions: 
(1)  After deployment, sensor nodes remain stationary at their initial locations. 
(2)  Each sensor node is assumed to be aware of its own geographic location. Sensors and mobile 
base stations can determine their own locations using GPS [27-29] (or another method for determining 
locations [19,20,30-33]) 
(3) Sensor nodes communicate with base stations by delivering data across multiple hops [34]. 
That is to say, sources and base stations are typically much further apart than a single radio radius. 
(4)  The sensor nodes are homogeneous, and wireless channels are bidirectional. Each sensor node 
has limited battery energy. 
(5)  The sensor nodes are assumed to know a network’s location which is in the interest region. 
3. The Location-aware Dynamic Session-key Generation for Grid-based WSNs Scheme 
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme for grid-based generation of a dynamic key to improve the 
security of previous methods. Our protocol is based on grid-based sensor networks. If a sensor node is 
selected from the sensors in a grid to announce the selection result and is used for routing, it is called a 
cluster node. Each base station can obtain information on an event from a grid header. If the base 
station is interested in the event, it queries the source via the grid header. In the interest region, the 
base station designates the range for data aggregation. The proposed scheme can defend against 
various attacks and reduce energy consumption. Figure 6 shows the grid structure.  
Figure 6. Grid structure. 
 
3.1. Eliminating the Broadcast Storm Effect 
Broadcast storm effects may occur. To reduce the broadcast storm effect, each node will first 
broadcast its information to its neighboring nodes. The locations of the source and the interest region 
(see Section 3.3) will be used to limit the forwarding region. Thus, the broadcast storm problem can be Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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reduced to a certain degree. However, if the forwarding zone is large, there will be a lot of 
redundancies, contentions, and collisions in the zone. In our protocol, the parameter range in a query 
packet is used to limit the forwarding zone.  
The forwarding zone can be defined and limited. Let S and X be the source and destination of the 
cluster node. The forwarding zone Fan (θ, r), then, is an area in the shape of a fan from the grid S to 
the grid X with angle θ and radius r [22], as shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7. The flooding region. 
 
3.2. Grid Formation 
The entire area of a wireless sensor network is partitioned into a 2D logical grid (a 4 × 4 grid, as 
illustrated in Figure 8). Each grid is a square of size  d d  . Grids are identified (x,  y) using the 
conventional x y-coordinate system. So that it is aware of its location, each node is equipped with a 
positioning device, such as a GPS receiver, from which it can read its current location. For any given 
location, there is a predefined mapping of the location to its grid coordinate. Each grid ID, which is 
given by [CX, CY], is assigned as follows: in the first row, from left to right, the grid IDs are [1, 1],  
[2, 1], [3, 1], and [4, 1]. In the second row, the grid IDs are [1, 2], [2, 2], [3, 2], and [4, 2], and so on. 
Based on the coordinate (x, y), each node computes its CX and CY as follows: 
CX    

 

d
x
, CY   

 
 
d
y
                (1) 
where d  is the grid size, and CX and CY are the largest integers not greater than 
d
x
and 
d
y
, 
respectively.  
Using Equation (1), each node determines which grid it belongs to. Each node will also maintain a 
neighbor table. The neighbor table is generated using the periodic HELLO protocol [28] at the 
beginning of a network life. The HELLO packet is small. In addition, the HELLO overhead from the 
periodic HELLO protocol is very small. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Let r be the transmission distance of a radio signal. We use the maximum value 2 2 r d  . The 
maximum value d of a cluster node is located at a grid and is capable of talking to any of the cluster 
nodes of its 8 neighboring grids. However, a smaller d also means more cluster nodes in the network, 
which in turn implies a higher overhead for delivering a packet, as well as more broadcast storm. Thus, 
there exists some tradeoff in choosing a moderate d value. 
Figure 8. Grid index. 
 
 
In each grid, one sensor node is selected to be the header of that grid. We call a node a “header” 
when it has more remaining energy than other nodes in that grid. Figure 9 shows a physical area 
partitioned into logical grids. 
Figure 9. A physical area partitioned into logical grids 
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3.3. Selection of an Interest Region  
When an interesting event happens in the selected region, a sensor node will be conscious of this 
event. After the event, a sensor node will broadcast a packet to find one-hop neighboring nodes. If a 
neighboring node is conscious of the event, it will forward this packet and store this message in an 
events table. We describe the event process below. 
Step 1: When an event of interest happens in the interest region, a sensor node will be conscious of 
this event. The sensor node will broadcast a packet to its one-hop neighboring nodes. 
Step 2: After receiving the packet, the neighboring nodes will be conscious of the event and will go 
to the next step; otherwise, the neighboring nodes will drop this packet. 
Step 3: The neighboring nodes will forward the packet and store this message in their events table. 
For example, in Figure 10, node E is conscious of an event occurring in its region. Node E will 
broadcast a packet to its one-hop neighboring nodes A, B, C, D, F, G, H and I. Because Nodes A, B, C, 
D, F, G, H and I are now conscious of the event in his region after receiving the packet, they will 
forward this packet and store this message in their events table. Nodes J, K, and L will drop this packet 
since they are not conscious of the event. 
Figure 10. Selected interest region. 
 
3.4. Cluster Node Election 
To make certain that the cluster node stays alive in each grid, an efficient method for cluster node 
selection is necessary. Residual energy is used in the selection of the cluster node. In each grid, when 
the original cluster node residual energy is less than the assumed threshold, one node will be selected 
as the cluster node for that grid. To maintain the quality of routes, we let the cluster node of a grid be 
the node with the largest residual energy in that grid. 
After a sensor node detects an interest region, the cluster node is selected. The steps for selecting a 
cluster node are follows: 
Step 1: In the interest region, each sensor node sends a cluster node selection request   
packet < node_id, Grid_id, Residual_Energy, Timeout > to the other nodes, where Grid_id is an 
identification code for the grid and Residual_Energy is the residual energy of a node in a grid. If the Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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time it takes for a cluster node to receive the selection request packet is greater than the Timeout value, 
then the packet is discarded. 
Step 2: When a node receives the cluster node selection request packet, the node judges whether it 
has the largest residual energy. If it does, the node becomes a cluster node; otherwise, the request 
packet is discarded. 
The cluster node will be selected periodically to keep the gateway from running out of energy. 
The main feature of our scheme is as follows. We assume that a cluster node has the most residual 
energy. When a cluster node detects an interesting event, it will broadcast a packet to all the cluster 
nodes. Thus, all the cluster nodes will know whether an event has occurred. When a base station wants 
to know whether there has been an interesting event, it sends a request packet to ask the cluster node in 
its grid. When the cluster node receives the request packet, it sends a reply packet to the base station. 
3.5. Notation 
The notations used in our scheme and in this paper are given below, along with their meaning. 
h( )  the one-way hash function, used for key generation. 
ai, ai−1  two parameters used for generating a key which is pre-deployed in the ith sensor node, 
and ai+1 = h (ai). 
bi, bi−1  two parameters used for generating a key which is pre-deployed in the ith cluster node. 
N1, N2, N3  three nonces. 
Ksi  the ith key of the sensor node. 
Kci   the ith key of the cluster node. 
Kmsg  the key used for encrypting or decrypting the updated-key message msgﬁnish. 
Seed  the seed for updating the key which is pre-deployed in each of the sensor nodes. 
IDsi   the identity of the ith sensor node. 
IDci   the identity of the ith cluster node. 
IDBi   the identity of the ith base station. 
Csi  the encrypted information generated by the ith sensor node. 
Cci  the encrypted information generated by the ith cluster node. 
Cb  the encrypted information generated by the base station. 
IDlist  the identity set list of the t sensor nodes received from the cluster nodes, such as 
). ,..., , ( 2 1 st s s list ID ID ID ID   
Klist  the key of the sensor nodes generated by the cluster node, such as 
). ,..., , ( 2 1 st s s list K K K K   
Mi  the plaintext information is generated by the ith sensor node. 
Mf  the latest information received by the base station. 
E(M,K)  the symmetric encryption infrastructure makes use of key K (for example, AES-128 
bits) to encrypt M. 
D(M,K)  the symmetric decryption infrastructure makes use of key K (for example, AES-128 
bits) to decrypt M. 
A? = B  determine whether A equal to B. 
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3.6. Communication Protocol 
In our proposed protocol, we use a dynamic key management mechanism. In this mechanism, two 
keys are preset in each sensor node. These two keys generate a new key for the next round, and will 
also be preset in the cluster node. The generation of the session key will be the same as the generation 
of the key in the sensor node. Using this key management mechanism, we can thus ensure the security 
of the data transmission. The transmission paths of the sensor network are shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Transmission paths for the sensor network. 
 
 
We divide our protocol into the following steps, as shown in Figure 12. 
Step 1: When the deployed sensor node i returns the collected data Mi, the sensor node will make 
use of the preset parameters ai and ai-1 to generate a key, Ksi, where  
) , ( 1   i i si a a h K        ( 2 )  
Furthermore, the two parameters Kmsg and the Seed preset in each of the nodes will use the hash 
function to generate a new message key, K’msg, where:  
) , (
' Seed K h K msg msg         ( 3 )  
At that time, the sensor node generates N1 and makes use of Ksi to encrypt the collected data Mi, the 
preset K’msg, and N1 into packet Csi as follows: 
) ), , ' , (( 1 si msg i si K N K M E C        ( 4 )  
The sensor node also computes the message authentication code MAC1 as follows: 
MAC1 = h (IDsi, Ksi)        (5) 
The  ) , , ( 1 si si ID MAC C  is then transmitted to the cluster node.  Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Figure 12. The communication protocol. 
 
 
Step 2: When the cluster node receives more than t packets, or when the period is longer than a 
specified time, the cluster node will record and transmit the identity, IDsi, of the sensor node. It will 
also arrange a list, IDlist 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 st s s list ID ID ID ID        ( 6 )  
The cluster node will make use of the two preset parameters ai and ai-1 to generate a key, Kci, where  
) 1 , (   i a i a h ci K                   (7) 
At that time, the cluster node will generate N2 and make use of Kci to encrypt IDlist and N2 
) ), , (( 2 ci list ci K N ID E C        ( 8 )  
After that, the cluster node computes the following message authentication code MAC2 and MAC3 as 
follows: 
MAC2 = h (IDci, Kci)        (9) 
MAC3 = h (IDlist, Kci)        (10) 
The cluster node sends (Cci, MAC1, MAC2, MAC3, IDci) to the base station.  
Step 3: After receiving the packet from the cluster node, the base station will seek the 
corresponding key Kci to verify the cluster node’s identity and decrypt Cci as follows: 
h (IDci, Kci)? = MAC2       (11) 
) , ( ) , ( 2 ci ci list K C D N ID        ( 1 2 )  
Next, the base station will check the integrity of the IDlist using 
h (IDlist, Kci) ? = MAC3      ( 1 3 )  
1.1 Ksi = h(ai , ai-1) 
1.2 K’msg = h(Kmsg,Seed) 
1.3 Csi= E((Mi,K’msg, N1),Ksi) 
1.4 MAC1=h(IDsi, Ksi) 
Csi,MAC1,IDsi 
2.1 Kci = h(bi , bi-1) 
2.2 Cci = E((IDlist, N2), Kci) 
2.3 MAC2=h(IDci, Kci) 
2.4 MAC3=h(IDlist, Kci) 
4.1 (Klist, IDlist,, N2,N3)=D(Cb,Kci) 
4.2 Check N2 
4.3 ( Mi,K’msg,,N1)= D(Csi,Ksi)  
4.4 Mf = (M1+M2,…,+Mt)/t 
4.5 C’ci = E((Mf,N3),Kci) 
4.6 Cm=E((msgfinish,N1, N3),K’msg) 
4.7 Updated session key as K’ci 
    K’ci = h(Kci , bi, N2) 
3.1 h(IDci, Kci)?=MAC2 
3.2 ( IDlist,, N2)=D(Cci,Kci) 
3.3 h(IDlist, Kci) ?= MAC3 
3.4 h(IDsi, Ksi)?= MAC1  
3.5 Cb = E((Klist, IDlist, N2,N3),Kci) 
5.1 (Mf,N3)=D(C’ci,Kci)  
5.2 Check N3 
5.3 Update K’si,K’ci 
    K’si = h(Ksi, ai, N3) 
    K’ci = h(Kci, bi, N2) 
6.1 (msgfinish,N1, N3)=D(Cm,K’msg)  
6.2 Check N1 
6.3 Update next session key as K’si 
6.4 K’si = h(Ksi, ai, N3) 
6.5 K’’msg = h(K’msg,Kmsg) 
6.6 C’si= E((M’i,K’’msg ),K’si)  Cm 
Cci,MAC1,MAC2,MAC3,IDci
Cb 
C’ci,IDci 
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Based on the IDlist, the base station will search for the corresponding key Ksi and arrange them into 
the key list Klist, where  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 st s s list K K K K  . It will verify the sensor node’s identity using 
h (IDsi, Ksi) ? = MAC1       (14) 
If the above verifications fail, this packet will be discarded.  
At that time, the base station will generate N3 and make use of Kci to encrypt ) , , , ( 3 2 N N ID K list list . The 
encrypted data Cb will be sent to the cluster node, where 
) ), , , , (( 3 2 ci list list b K N N ID K E C        (15) 
Step 4: When the cluster node receives the response data Cb from the base station, it will make use 
of the key Kci, which is generated by itself, to decrypt Cb  
) , ( ) , , , ( 3 2 ci b list list K C D N N ID K        (16) 
The cluster node will then check whether N2 is equal to the N2 generated in step 2. 
The cluster node can only use the ith key Ksi of the sensor node of Klist to decrypt Csi; otherwise, this 
packet is discarded.  
) , ( ) , ' , ( 1 si si msg i K C D N K M        ( 1 7 )  
After that, the cluster node will calculate the average value of each set of data and obtain Mf as 
follows:  
t M M M M t f / ) ,..., ( 2 1           ( 1 8 )  
This ensures that the data is accurate when it is transmitted to the backend. This cluster node will 
make use of Kci to encrypt Mf and N3 into C'ci,  
) ), , (( ' 3 ci f ci K N M E C         ( 1 9 )  
The cluster node identity IDci along with C’ci are transmitted together to the base station. At that 
time, the cluster node will update the session key into K’ci for the next round. 
) , ( ' i ci ci a K h K          ( 2 0 )  
Furthermore, the cluster node will make use of the key K’msg, transmitted from the sensor node, to 
encrypt the transmitted update message msgfinish as follows: 
Cm = E ( (msgfinish ) , , 3 1 N N , K’msg)      (21) 
The encrypted packet Cm will then be broadcasted to the sensor nodes to inform the sensor nodes 
that message transmission is completed. The cluster node will update the session key to K’ci, where 
K’ci = h (Kci , bi, N2)        (22) 
Step 5: When the base station receives the packet from the cluster node, it will confirm the identity 
IDcj of the cluster node first. It will also search for the key Kci to decrypt C’ci 
) , ' ( ) , ( 3 ci ci f K C D N M       ( 2 3 )  
The base station will then check whether N3 is equal to the N3 generated in step 3. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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Simultaneously, the base station will update the key of the cluster node and sensor node, which will 
be updated to K'si and K'ci, as follows:  
) , , ( ' 3 N a K h K i si si         ( 2 4 )  
) , , ( ' 2 N b K h K i ci ci        ( 2 5 )  
Step 6: After receiving the message Cm, the sensor node will make use of K’msg for decryption, and 
will obtain the message msgfinish as follows: 
) ' , ( ) , , ( 3 1 msg m finish K C D N N msg       (26) 
The sensor node will then check whether N1 is equal to the N1 generated in step 1. 
The previously generated keys Ksi and ai are used to generate a new key K'si, where  
) , , ( ' 3 N a K h K i si si        ( 2 7 )  
K'si will be used to encrypt the transmitted data for the next transmission. When the sensor node 
transmits the data in the third round, the original message key K’msg will be updated to K''msg, where 
) , ' ( " msg msg msg K K h K 
      ( 2 8 )  
The message key K''msg and the detected message M’i are encrypted by using K'si to C'si, where 
) ' ), " , ' (( ' si msg i si K K M E C        ( 2 9 )  
When the sensor node transmits data for the fourth time, the message key must be updated to K'''msg, 
where 
) ' , ' ' ( ' ' ' msg msg msg K K h K        ( 3 0 )  
The updated message key K'''msg and the detected message M’’i are encrypted by using K’’si to C’'si,  
) ' ' ), ' ' ' , ' ' (( ' ' si msg i si K K M E C       (31) 
The session keys Ksi, K'si and K’’si ( )     , , ' ( ' ' 1 Nounce a K h K i si si   ) etc. are used for encrypting messages 
between the cluster node and the sensor node. In addition, the updated K''msg and K'''msg are the 
message keys which the cluster node uses to transmit complete messages msgfinsh to the sensor node 
during communication. 
4. Security and Performance Analysis 
4.1. Security Analysis  
4.1.1. Security against Malicious Guessing Attacks 
When a sensor network has been deployed for a certain period, the key database of the base station 
will be updated after a transaction so that an attacker cannot obtain the correct key to use in the next 
transmission. Each node includes the records of not more than three keys, which consist of two old 
keys and one newly generated key. When the new key is generated, the oldest key will be updated. 
This can improve the security of the network and reduce the memory load of the nodes. Sensors 2010, 10                                       
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4.1.2. Security against Replay Attacks 
In each communication session, including communication from the sensor node to the cluster node 
or communication from the cluster node to the base station, “two-way” mutual authentication is used 
to prevent the replay attack. We use the nonces N1, N2 and N3 to check each communication message. 
Any communication can be determined to be legal or illegal by checking the correctness of the nonces. 
The related descriptions are given in steps 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2 in Figure 12. Our scheme is able to prevent 
replay attacks. 
4.1.3. Security against Falsification Attacks 
To ensure secure transmission, we use the keys Ksi and Kci to encrypt data transmitted between the 
cluster node and between the cluster node and the base station, respectively. When the sensor node 
returns the data to the cluster node,  ) ), ' , " , ' (( ' 1 si msg i si K N K M E C  is used for encryption. When the 
communication between the cluster node and the base station is finished, Klist is obtained. The base 
station returns Ksi to the cluster node, and decryption begins. If the received key cannot decrypt the 
received packet, the received packet will be regarded as an illegal packet and will be abandoned. This 
practice ensures the integrity of the data transmitted, and guarantees that the data is sent from the 
sensor node administered by the cluster node. 
4.1.4. Security against Man-in-the-Middle-Attacks and Guarantee of Data Privacy 
When the sensor node communicates with the cluster node, the encryption mechanism is used to 
prevent man-in-the-middle attacks and ensure data privacy. The transmitted message is encrypted into
) ), , ' , (( 1 si msg i si K N K M E C  . The cluster node and the base station also use a similar method to prevent 
similar attacks and to ensure data privacy.  
The attacker cannot obtain the protected data. Furthermore, the cluster node makes use of Kmsg to 
encrypt the complete message, and the message key will be updated for each transaction. Therefore, 
the attacker cannot imitate the cluster node to transmit a message. The man-in-the-middle-attack can 
thus be prevented. 
4.1.5. Security against Node Capture Attacks  
When security is needed to transmit data between the cluster node and the sensor node or between 
the cluster node and the base station node, we use the keys Ksi and Kci, respectively, for encryption. We 
make use of the one-way hash function to generate the key because the one-way hash function can 
prevent an attacker from inverting the key. (1) h(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x, 
making both hardware and software implementations practical. (2) For any given value y, it is 
computationally infeasible to find x such that h(x) = y. This is sometimes referred to in the literature as 
the one-way property. (3) For any given block x, it is computationally infeasible to find z not equal to x 
with h(z) = h(x). This is sometimes referred to as weak collision resistance. A comparison of the 
security and characteristics of the grid-based schemes is given in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The security and characteristic comparison of the grid-based schemes. 
 
TTDD [15,16]  CODE [17]  DARQ [20,21] 
Our 
proposal 
Against malicious guessing attacks  NA  NA  NA  Yes 
Against replay attacks  NA  NA  NA  Yes 
Against falsification attacks  NA  NA  NA  Yes 
Against man-in-the-middle-attacks 
and guarantee of data privacy  NA  NA  NA  Yes 
Against node capture attacks  NA  NA  NA  Yes 
Grid-based protocol  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Event-driven data dissemination  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Limit interest region to prevent 
flooding storm  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Routing problem with obstacles in 
sensor field  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Routing problem with voids in sensor 
field Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
 
(1) Because TTDD, CODE and DARQ do not support dynamic session-key management, they 
may be susceptible to various attacks. 
(2)  In CODE and TTDD, the base stations have to reissue a query to request data or use local 
flooding to request data when they move out of the original grid. This will increase energy 
consumption and the number of collisions. DARQ and our scheme will limit the interest region to 
prevent a flooding storm. 
(3)  If the base station moves out of the original grid, it reconstructs a new routing path. But CODE 
does not solve the routing problem when there are obstacles or voids in a sensor field. 
4.2. Mutual Authentication 
The base station uses MAC2 (h (IDci, Kci) ? = MAC2 ) to authenticate the cluster node’s identity, 
MAC3 (h (IDlist, Kci) ? = MAC3) to authenticate the integrity of IDlist and MAC1 (h (IDsi, Ksi) ? = MAC1) 
to authenticate the sensor node’s identity. The reason is that the sensor node and cluster node are peer 
nodes. The cluster node does not store information related to the sensor node. The sensor node should 
therefore be authenticated by the base station. Otherwise, the cluster node can use N2 to authenticate 
the base station. The sensor node can use N1 to authenticate the cluster node. Our scheme performs 
mutual authentication. This makes it easier to detect an attacker. 
  
Attacks 
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4.3. Performance Analysis 
Table 3 shows a comparison of the time complexity between our proposed protocol and Mizanur 
Rahman and El-Khatib’s scheme. Table 4 shows a comparison of the communication cost between  
our scheme and Mizanur Rahman and El-Khatib’s scheme. Table 5 shows a simulation which we 
developed based on NS2 (Network Simulation 2). 
Table 3. Comparison of time complexity between our scheme and Mizanur Rahman and 
El-Khatib’s scheme.  
Nodes Relationship  Mizanur Rahman and  
El-Khatib’s scheme [23]
Our scheme 
Sensor node (or L-node)  TKEY+ 2Th+ TV +TEECC  1TE +1TD+ 5Th 
Cluster node (or H-node)  TKEY+ TEECC+ 2Th+ TV  3TE+2TD+ 4Th+1TDIV+tTADD  
Base station  N/A  1TE +2TD+ 3TV+ 5Th 
Notes:  
TE: the time complexity for using a symmetric encryption algorithm 
TD: the time complexity for using a symmetric decryption algorithm 
TV: the time complexity for verifying a message 
Th: the time complexity for using a hash function 
TADD: the time complexity for addition 
TDIV: the time complexity for division 
t: the number of aggregation data for a cluster node  
TKEY: the time complexity for generating an ECC secret key 
TEECC: the time complexity for ECC encryption 
Table 4. Comparison of communication cost between our scheme and Mizanur Rahman 
and El-Khatib’s scheme. 
Nodes  Relationship  Mizanur Rahman and 
El-Khatib’s scheme[23] 
Our scheme 
Sensor node and Cluster node 
(or H-node)  
2T’R +2T’h+2T’EECC  2T’E +1T’MSG+1T’h 
Cluster node (or H-node) and 
Base station 
N/A  3T’E +2T’MSG+3T’h 
H-node and H-node  T’EECC +4T’R+2T’h  N/A 
Notes: 
T’E:  the transmission time for a symmetric encryption message (For example AES-128 bits)  
T’MSG: the transmission time for a message (16 bits, for example IDsi, IDci) 
T’h: the transmission time for a hash message (for example, hash message of 168 bits) 
T’EECC: the transmission time for an ECC ciphertext (for example, a ciphertext of 256 bits) 
T’R: the transmission time for a random number (for example, random number of 16 bits) 
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Table 5. Parameters used in the simulation environment. 
Parameter Values 
Simulation tool  NS2 
Simulation area  2,000 m × 2,000 m 
Number of nodes  100–400 nodes 
Base station mobility model  Random waypoint model 
Radio transmission range  100 m 
Data packet size  64 bytes 
Data transmission rate  1 Mbps 
 
The Mizanur Rahman and El-Khatib’s scheme is based on ECC public key encryption and the 
random number challenge response mechanism. By contrast our scheme is based on the symmetric 
cryptosystem and hash function mechanism. From Table 3 and Table 4, we can see that the operation 
time of our scheme is faster than that of Mizanur Rahman and El-Khatib’s scheme for a large number 
of sensors. But the H-node end of Mizanur Rahman and El-Khatib’s scheme is superior to ours for one 
transaction. However, the detailed analyses are presented in our scheme. Otherwise, the Mizanur 
Rahman and El-Khatib’s scheme should process a key agreement procedure in advance, our scheme 
only uses the dynamic parameters to complete the same function without specific communication 
during transaction. Our scheme is simpler. Two mechanisms are different; but the differences in 
communication cost are not significant. 
Figure 13. Comparison of energy consumption versus number of grids for different schemes. 
 
 
In the following section, we compare the energy consumed in our proposed scheme to the energy 
consumed in other schemes. A comparison of the total energy consumption in other schemes for 
various different numbers of nodes is shown in Figure 13. As can be seen, the total energy consumed 
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in the proposed scheme and in the DARQ, CODE and TTDD schemes increased when the number of 
grids increased. However, the total energy consumed in our scheme is less than the energy consumed 
in the CODE and TTDD schemes, but is more than the DARQ scheme. Since our scheme uses a grid-
based mechanism to restrict the possibility of packet flooding, such a result meets our expectations. 
However, although our scheme is based on the DARQ scheme, more energy is consumed in encryption 
computation. 
5. Conclusions 
We proposed an efficient management mechanism for WSNs that includes the following benefits: 
(1)  The proposed mechanism can significantly conserves the memory of a sensor node. 
(2)  Dynamic key management for each data transmission is used only once. This method reduces 
the probability of an attacker guessing a key correctly. The method thus improves security. 
(3) The total energy consumed in our scheme is less than the energy consumed in the other 
schemes except the DARQ scheme. 
(4)  The proposed scheme uses a grid-based approach. In addition to using grids, we also limited the 
flooding region to decrease the overhead for routing discovery in order to reduce the probability of a 
flooding storm.  
In future research, we will propose a solution to find a routing detour around void regions. Void 
regions exist in a network because some grids do not deploy sensors. The design of multiple interest 
regions will be taken into consideration to provide data aggregation for WSNs. 
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